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ABSTRACT
Ministers are always calling for more evidence-based
interventions. Do they apply the same criterion to their
own work of making policy? Perhaps surprisingly, policy
making is not an evidence-free zone. However, it is
important to understand the ways in which policy
makers in different situations will use information
differently, count different kinds of information as
evidence, and so exercise different styles of judgment.
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What price evidence-based policy?
When doctors and social workers and other professionals
are being expected to confine themselves to using only
those interventions that are ‘evidence-based’, they can
perhaps be forgiven for complaining that ministers and
civil servants do not seem to subject their own policy-
making activity to the same discipline. From the point of
view of those who deal with clients and patients, policy is
something that is made at them; it often feels like living
under a relentless Niagara of new initiatives, each eddy of
which is as based as little or as loosely on careful analysis
of the lessons of the past and of other countries as the last.
White Papers on ‘modernisation’ of health and social care
do not carry annexes with meta-analyses of policy
evaluations. Ministerial speeches are not published with
lists of references. New initiatives – care trusts, for example
– are extended nationally even before pilot projects have
been completed or evaluated. And yet the Treasury and the
Cabinet Office place great emphasis on ‘evidence-based
policy making’. The new Centre for Management and Policy
Studies is charged with institutionalising such a culture
across government. A recent Performance and Innovation
Unit report, Adding it up (2000), called for much greater use
of formal modelling in policy making. The research and
statistical divisions of government departments are no less
active and no smaller than under previous administrations,
and in some cases have expanded slightly under New
Labour. Is all this just sham? Is policy making really an
evidence-free zone?
In this article, I shall argue that policy makers do in fact
make extensive use of evidence, but the nature of the use
made of evidence and the nature of the evidence sought
may be quite different from that which characterises the
academic researcher conducting a meta-analysis of a bank
of evaluative studies, and different again from the use of
evidence in the exercise of professional judgment.
Moreover, I shall argue, in a democracy, so it should be. My
own argument is based mainly on a selective review of the
literature on policy making (it is too vast and ill-bounded
for any rigorous meta-analysis), supplemented with some
case studies for a forthcoming study (6, 2002 forthcoming).
It therefore has the status of a hypothesis, not an
established account that has survived a full-scale attempt at
falsification.
By ‘making policy’, I mean the process of coming to
agreement within government about the general direction
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or indeed the specific of governmental action or
intervention (or indeed inaction) (Hogwood & Gunn, 1984
pp13-20).
Policy making – an information machine
Evidence should not be defined too narrowly. For the
present purpose, I shall define ‘evidence’ to mean
‘information that is relevant to making a decision to
commit to one policy or another or none, because it
indicates the possible or probable benefits, risks,
acceptability or status of a policy’. This is a deliberately
wide definition. For if policy makers do not confine
relevant evidence to that which comes in formally
organised and structured forms – for example, the
randomised controlled trial, or the experiment – then they
are hardly alone; no account of professional judgment
suggests that clinicians or social workers or teachers do so
either (Dowie & Elstein, 1984). 
A central problem that policy makers have always faced is
not one of trying to work with insufficient relevant
information about what to do, but that of managing the
excess (Simon, 1977 [1960]). Faced with information
overload, the danger is not that one uses no evidence at all,
but that one uses simply the most readily available. This is
not a new problem; the emperor Marcus Aurelius’s
notebooks frequently note the difficulties in standing back
from the torrent of putatively relevant information to
maintain focus on the important things and not to be
coerced by the latest consideration put forward (Marcus
Aurelius, 1964, Book VI, ¶52, VII, ¶68, IX, ¶15). Policy
judgment is then a problem of appreciation of what counts
as relevant, a problem of classifying types of information –
essentially a problem of achieving more rather less
intelligent information-rejection (Thompson & Wildavsky,
1986). Policy makers, like everyone else, need to reject
huge quantities of information as less relevant, as less
important, as impossible for them to process or take
seriously without compromising fatally their ability to
function, or they cannot allocate the scarcest resource in
government, namely attention, to problems (March &
Olsen, 1975).
This problem arises because policy makers need
information, not only about the effectiveness of a
procedure and the relationship between the risks and the
benefits, but also about its acceptability to wider publics,
its acceptability to key constituencies (clients, taxpayers,
professional and producer interests), its ease and cost of
implementation. For policy makers use information in the
way that they do because the central challenge of political
judgment is not just to exercise sound technical policy
judgment, but to conciliate between all the interests and
institutions of the society, and between the interests and
institutions represented in the policy-making process.
Playing the policy-making game 
Most importantly, however, policy makers undertake this
work under quite specific institutional constraints. The
varieties of basic situation in which policy makers find
themselves will shape what information they can reject,
what they learn, how they will be able to exercise
judgment.
We can think about the policy process as a relationship
between groups of policy makers in four different
situations, each driven by their situation to organise, to use
information and to think differently.
The poker players
The leader of a party group or a cabinet minister is
surrounded by people whose loyalty cannot be indefinitely
relied upon, and who cannot readily be trusted with
information. The more senior are her lieutenants, the more
ambitious they are, the more they want her job, and the
more capable they are of overthrowing her, should she fail
them electorally, make mistakes that cost them public
opinion poll ratings, or fail to consult them adequately.
The cadre consists of rivals for influence, for budgetary
resources and for information, and they exhibit varying
degrees of short- and long-term ruthlessness in pursuit of
the ambition, without which they would not have become
leaders.
Information is valued here as long as one’s own control
over it can be secured and while the fact of one’s own
possession of it is not generally known. However, the
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evidence and information sought are typically information
about what might be acceptable, what might make one’s
mark, what areas of policy look open for new initiatives
that might enhance one’s position. Information will count
as evidence whether or not it is linked in any systematic
way to other bodies of information; indeed, in this setting,
it may be the more valuable for being disconnected, for
then it may be easier to keep that information proprietary.
Elected executive leaders are serial specialists with fields of
information, with access to plenty of policy-relevant
information that is proprietary to their departments, or
even to their own offices. Judgment here is a matter of
insight.
Thus, a secretary of state for health wants evidence about
what other spending ministers will do, but also pays
peculiar attention to opinion polls, analyses of focus group
research, patient satisfaction surveys, as well as to
information indicating areas of policy in which no action
has been taken for a while and in which something
dramatic and also affordable might be done, that could
elicit at least short-term advantage. Moreover, information
about another spending minister’s fallback position in
negotiations with the Treasury is vital evidence in decision
making. However, information must be rejected that would
suggest the effectiveness of a policy which is unaffordable
or unpopular with key constituencies, or that would
downgrade the importance of the minister’s own role and
department.
Executive leaders are essentially competitive individualists.
They are poker players with information, played for high
stakes, each player trying to bluff and call bluffs while
keeping from other players any information about the cards
they hold.
The chess players
Professional policy analysts working in a civil service
department such as Health, an agency chief executive’s
office, or for a chief officer in a major spending
department, by contrast, work under disciplines that
encourage them to share information with each other, to
trust their peers, to collaborate in teams. They are
disciplined both by the intellectual standards that their
work must meet, and by the formal systems of authority
and accountability that govern the role of officers.
Here, the evidence sought and used is formal data,
organised into structured data bases. ‘Evidence-based’
means ‘researcherly’ in this context. The division of labour
between different specialisms – and professionals usually
work within a single specialism for much of their career –
encourages sharing of information, but only within the
unit or department. The rivalry between departments for
budgetary resources and influence means that professional
policy units must keep proprietary from other units. For
these policy makers, judgment is a matter of analytical
inference.
In the Department of Health, for example, policy units are
likely to make extensive use of expert commissions and
meta-analyses, to commission research, to use
epidemiological models of the responsiveness of disease
and need to interventions. However, they will also value
evidence from highly structured alternative budget
projections which will certainly not be revealed to other
departments or to the Treasury, save on very advantageous
and specifically negotiated terms. Evidence has to be
rejected, or at least downplayed, that would suggest the
irrelevance or inappropriateness of hierarchical
organisation – for example, information that would suggest
that patient or client preferences alone could determine
meaningful policy choice; such units will be astute to every
inconsistency, vagueness or incompleteness in subjective
information that enables them to deem it ‘anecdotal’.
Professional policy analysts are situated within a basically
hierarchical system. They are essentially chess players with
information; all the pieces are out in the open for other
players to see, the rules governing moves are tightly
defined, but the numbers who can play by these rules are
very limited.
The Snap! players
Backbench elected members of parliament or councillors
(other than those who are members of some faction –
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more on their situation in a moment) may be subject to
greater or less discipline from the whips, depending on the
political culture of the legislature or council, but they have
few incentives to work together, to become either specialists
or generalists, or to need to trust one another.
Opportunities for influence or promotion into executive or
scrutiny roles are few and seem to come, from the
backbencher’s point of view, randomly. They may have
limited ties to their constituency, just as they have few ties
to each other. In this situation, policy makers make
essentially opportunistic use of unstructured information
and evidence. What is important about that information is
not its range, structure, or rigorous integration with banks
of structured data, but its usefulness in enabling these
backbenchers to solve short-term problems – for example,
to survive through challenges in their local constituency, to
avoid discipline by the whips while at the same time
making some impact on their party. They possess little
proprietary information, and typically tend to be eclectic in
the policy information they can create or collect. They have
few incentives to be specialists. Backbenchers are essentially
isolates. For them, judgment is groping for clues on how
to cope.
The game they play with information is Snap! They do not
deal the cards, the opportunities for influence seem to
come randomly, and the game of the policy process has
little structure.
The football players
Finally, there are faction members, both among the elected
councillors and among certain groups of officers, united
only by a certain ideological commitment to certain sorts
of principle, which they see the need to press upon a
leadership of whose commitment to those principles they
cannot be certain. They typically have limited access to
influence. They must act opportunistically, hoping
reactively to mobilise disaffection with the style and the
decisions of others. It is hard for such leaders to discipline
the faction, to prevent schism, for, although the bonds of
commitment to principle are quite strong, it is difficult to
legitimate the sanctions and hierarchical subordination that
work elsewhere. Internal trust with information is weak,
and relationships with other factions are marked by deep
rivalry and hostility. 
Evidence is important to factions, and that evidence has to
be connected and integrated. However, the kinds of
evidence that matter most are those which represent events,
problems, policies and other groups in the policy-making
process in terms of their relationship to the core set of
principles that bind the faction together.
Factions have weak capacity to create proprietary
information, but faction members tend to be generalists,
because their outlook on policy is guided by principles
which they seek to apply across a wide range of policy areas
– for example, care free at the point of use, or at true
market prices. Factions are suspicious of the professional
analyst’s attention to the peculiarities of problems, seeing
this as the excuse for avoiding principled action (‘yes, but
not in this case’), and so they reject evidence about such
specificities. Here, judgment is the application of
principle.
Factions are essentially sect-like. The game they play with
information in the policy process is football; the key
challenge is to hold the team together and keep the fervour
of the fans, and the faction leader – the football manager –
must expect to be sacked from time to time.
Styles of judgment
Each of the four basic situations produces a distinctive style
of policy judgment. Professional units can often afford to
be more long-term in their focus, and to pay more
attention to specific features of problems. Factions stress
general principles, but have no particular reason to be
short-termist in their thinking, except during one of the
periodic episodes of campaigning fervour when they must
fight for every issue, however small, in order to sustain their
own cohesion. Backbenchers and executive leaders tend to
be short-termist, but for quite different reasons: the former
because they have to survive and cope in a policy process
controlled by others, and the latter because of the urgency
of the issues, crises and rivalries that organise their power.
Executive leaders need to focus on political factors in
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judgment rather than general principles or specific features
of policy problems.
Each of these styles, too, has its distinctive weaknesses.
Professional units can sometimes exhibit a tin ear for
important political dimensions, imagining the whole policy
world to be like chess. Thinking only of the poker,
competitive leaders can sometimes find it hard to work
together to tackle problems. Isolated backbenchers, too, but
for different reasons, sometimes find it hard to work
together, either to hold the executive to account or to sustain
a strong executive, and sometimes focus on ward concerns at
the expense of the larger goals. Factions, with their relentless
commitment to principle, can be blind to the exigencies and
vicissitudes that drive practical policy making.
There are combinations and hybrid forms of these four
situations, and some contexts can move between these types;
for example, local authority scrutiny committees can, in
different contexts, take several forms.
These are not psychological types. No-one is born a
factionalist or a competitive cadre member, nor remains one
having once been in these situations. Rather, these tendencies
and capabilities are the product of these basic institutional
situations in which policy makers find themselves. To see
that they provide a jointly exhaustive account of the range of
contexts, they can be shown to derive from the two basic
dimensions on which social science has always measured
social organisation – namely, Durkheim’s (1951 [1897])
concepts of social regulation and social integration, or
Douglas’ (1982 [1978]) grid and group; perhaps strong and
weak ‘institutional constraints’ and ‘bonds to others’ might
be clearer. Cross-tabulating these two dimensions yields a
two-by-two matrix. The highly constrained (subject to
intellectual and managerial disciplines) and highly bonded
(defined teams) form is clearly the world of hierarchy, which
is exemplified in the policy process by professional policy
units; the weakly bonded and weakly constrained world is
that of individualism, exemplified in the policy process by
the competitive leadership cadre; factions are a good example
of the world of sect, which is highly bonded but weakly
disciplined; finally, backbenchers exhibit all the hallmarks of
the heavily constrained but weakly bonded world of isolates.
Figure 1 (overleaf) shows the relationship between them.
The central hypothesis is that the nature of ‘evidence’ and
relevance reproduces the institutional organisation of policy
makers (Durkheim & Mauss, 1963 [1902] pp11, 81-88).
These four basic forms, with their characteristic uses of
information and definitions of what counts as evidence of
use in policy making, their styles of appreciation and
judgment, will spring up in any polity. For each emerges in
reaction to the others; the history of policy making is the tale
of their mutual confrontations and alliances. This is why no
one style can dominate indefinitely. The most one can hope
for is that policy makers in different situations may be able
to strike some kind of settlement between all four, at least for
a while, that might offset the weaknesses of each style to the
others.
In a democratic polity, policy making should reflect a wide
range of types of information that are counted as evidence,
not just technical evidence, eg about the cost-effectiveness of
interventions. Popular support, acceptability with key
constituencies, conformity with constitutional norms
sometimes argue for policies that may not turn out to be
particularly cost-effective, but the point of a democracy is to
give these factors due weight in the minds of policy makers.
The answer to the question, ‘Can policy making be evidence-
based?’, can only be that, like professional judgment, it
always makes use of some information as evidence, but that
there is a plurality – a limited plurality, indeed – of things
that count as evidence, and what counts depends on where
policy makers are situated. Policy making is not just an
irrational affair, in which evidence is irrelevant. On the other
hand, if what is meant by the question is to ask whether all
policy making can be reduced to the technical calculation of
effectiveness and cost of well-defined and costed policy
options, in which only effectiveness and cost matter, then the
answer must be ‘no’. And a good thing too – for the tyranny
of bureaucratic decision making is as damaging and
unsustainable as any other kind, in health and social care
policy just as much as in civil rights or military matters.
Better policy is more likely to come from the frank
acknowledgement that, in a democracy, we positively want a
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system that gives recognition to each kind of evidence and
judgment, to each kind of interest, and not just to those who
control the slide rule.
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Figure 1: THE FOUR BASIC INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
Backbenchers Professional units
Type of social organisation: isolates Type of social organisation: hierarchies
Game with information: snap! Game with information: chess
Information collection: eclectic Information collection: long-term specialists
Evidence sought: anecdote, information necessary Evidence sought: structured data, integrated into banks of 
to survive and sustain any impact, however casual, other data, about effectiveness, affordability, differences 
on the policy process between problems
Little access to proprietary information Proprietary information, shared within unit
Judgment as looking for coping responses Judgment as analytical inference
Leaders Factions
Type of social organisation: competitive individualists Type of social organisation: sects
Game with information: poker Game with information: football
Information collection: generalists, but serial short- Information collection: generalists
term specialism Evidence sought: information about deviations from
Evidence sought: inside dope, disconnected information principle, evidence about the merits of principled action
about opportunities Little proprietary information
Private information Judgment as application of principle
Judgment as insight into opportunities
Bonds to
peers
Constraints of
discipline
